INTEGRATIVE PSYCHIATRY*

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THE composition of a memorial lecture is one of those adventures without which no life is complete. I recommend it for everyman, and the younger, the better, for the experience is so very instructive. Thus once committed, you begin to cogitate the purposes of a memorial lecture. What is it for, and how does it differ from the ordinary lecture. If you chance to be as I am an inexperienced memorial lecturer, you are naturally prompted to investigate what others had done before. And there is where your instruction begins. You discover that memorial lectures have but one and only one quality in common: they bear the name of some person in whose memory the lecture is given. Otherwise they are without a common denominator.

I've come upon memorial lectures that did not memorialize; names attached to presentations that had neither rational bond, nor valid purpose. I've even come upon humor, and human foible. Ferenczi in memorializing Freud's seventieth birthday, and Ernest Jones[1] in memorializing Freud's death, both found themselves grossly embarrassed in their efforts to praise Freud. Freud's dicta on the bipolar quality of love and praise–hate and envy–weighed heavily upon their minds and tongue-tied their avowals. Their twisting and turning, their "yes-but" apologetics are indeed amusing, and also a bit pathetic.

For the pristine purpose of the memorial lecture one can turn to no better source than the testament of William Harvey. On July 28, 1656, Harvey, seventy-eight years of age, "said good-bye to the Fellows of the Royal College of Physicians and made over to the College forever his paternal estate of Burmash, Romney March, Essex, then valued at fifty-six pounds a year. Harvey had three objects in view in this gift"; to establish an annual feast, to found an annual oration at which the Fellows and members of the College should be "exhorted to study out the secrets of Nature by way of experiment, and most important even for us this day, they were to be urged to continue in love and affection

* The Annual Paul Schilder Memorial Lecture delivered at The New York Academy of Medicine on February 23, 1950.

amongst themselves." The third of Harvey's provisions was the stipend for a librarian who should also have the museum under his care. All of this, for fifty-six pounds the year![2]

It is congenial to our purpose to look closer into Harvey's testament. Of the three objectives avowed in his gift, that of affording a stipend for a librarian is understandably humane. Librarians, though ever so necessary and useful were even then none-too-generously rewarded. Beside, Harvey was a "bookish man."*

The third of his three objectives is thus readily understood. But the provisions for an annual feast, and particularly the conditions to be fulfilled by the orator, namely to exhort "the Fellows and the members to study out the secrets of Nature by way of experiment, and, to continue in love and affection amongst themselves"; these other provisions are somewhat challenging. Yet it requires no deep insight to recognize that Harvey wrote into this testament some of his life's experience; some of its disappointments and frustrations. England was rife with political conflict during Harvey's maturity. These were the days of the Long Parliament, of Charles I and of Oliver Cromwell. Harvey sided with the King, and for this partiality was visited by the Parliamentary troopers, who invading his chambers in Whitehall (1642) managed also to destroy many of the manuscripts containing the drawings and data of his experimental investigation on the embryo. Perhaps more disturbing and more disillusioning was the furor of opposition, calumny, and abuse that followed on the appearance of his *De Motu Cordis*. Not alone did his confrères abuse him for his temerity in contradicting Galen; Guy Patin declared Harvey's theory was "paradoxical, useless, false, impossible, absurd, and harmful," but the public also turned against him, and his practice declined. Disillusioned, and even somewhat embittered, Harvey did not, however, lose faith in the educability of his fellow men. One year before his death he made that remarkable gift which provided a living for the librarian, an annual feast, and an oration.

I took Harvey's testament as my pristine example of what the objectives of a *memorial lecture* should be, and I must admit it turns out even better than I had intended. For to come to the very core of the

* He gave the College its library building, books for the library, and surgical instruments, as well as curiosities for the museum. In his will he wrote: "Touching my bookes and household stuffe Pictures and apparell of which I have not already disposed I give to the Colledge of Physicians all my bookes and papers and my best Persia long Carpet and my blue sattin imbroyedyed Cushion one paire of brasse Andirons with fireshovell and tongues of brasse for the ornament of the meeting roome I have erected for that purpose."[2]

matter, our own times and our own experiences are like those of Harvey, and there is much of the Harveyan spirit in the man in whose memory we have gathered tonight.

I would not overtax the association. Schilder for certain was no Harvey. Few centuries sport his equal. Yet there was more than a touch of the genius in Paul Schilder. And in his spirit, in his devotion to "worming out the secrets of nature by way of experiment," Schilder was a most worthy disciple, and a distinguished follower of Harvey.

Schilder's death was shockingly sudden and unexpected. When in recoil his friends and associates spoke out their sense of grief and loss, there was no time for studied expression. They spoke as they felt about Schilder living, not Schilder dead. Theirs was *not* the speech mindful of the injunction *de mortuis nil nisi bonum.*

I will quote but a few among his many friends. "Schilder came as near to being a genius as any psychiatrist in the United States. He was an expert and well grounded neurologist, an exceptionally acute psychiatrist and psychoanalyst and a person of distinction in numerous fields of intellectual activity."[3]

Heinz Hartmann,[4] who has made the most ambitious critical analysis to date of Schilder's psychiatric work, describes Schilder as "one of those men who would have achieved great things in every branch of science." Hartmann signalizes just those qualities of Schilder's personality and scholarship which endeared him to all who knew him and gained him the esteem of the learned. Those qualities I would once again cite. Schilder had an immense capacity for and an urgent impulse for work. He had an astounding memory. He was versatile; he possessed the faculties of imaginative and critical thinking. He exercised these competences in both theoretical and clinical explorations. Schilder was able "to bridge the tension between contrasting worlds of thought, leaving relative independence to the subordinate viewpoints."[4] He "did not squeeze individual observations into the Procrustean bed of too limited theoretical formula, nor . . . on the other hand [did] the variety of the single phenomena get lost without being formed."[4]

In particular I like the *In Memoriam* by Fritz Wittels.[5] "It will be the task of the large community of his friends," Wittels wrote, "to collect and to organize his discoveries, observations, theories and critical comments, in order to find the basic plan which exists in every life dedicated to scientific work."

It is in the spirit of this obligation that I have given the title *Integrative Psychiatry* to this memorial lecture. By this title I intend neither to hint the launching of a new school, nor to give banner to any rump or secessionist faction. It is my intention rather, quite in the spirit of Schilder, to point up the great need in present-day psychiatry to integrate the data derived from all of the different disciplines devoted to the understanding of the behavior of men, in health and in disease, singly and collectively.

To seek the basic plan in Schilder's life is to engage on a most ambitious adventure. Fortunately Schilder himself, shortly before his death published an *Apologia*, which affords us a sketch of the basic plan of his inner, that is of his cultural and his scientific life.

Paul Schilder was born of Jewish parents, in the city of Vienna, Austria, on February 15, 1886. His father, who died when Paul was but three or four years of age, was of North-East European origin. He was a soap merchant. Paul affirmed that he had little or no recollection of his father. His mother, on the other hand, had a profound influence upon him. She was a strong and intelligent woman who early recognized her son's extraordinary endowments, and encouraged him in their cultivation. Paul had one brother, still surviving, with whom he appears to have had but little in common.

The death of Paul's father, when Paul was so young, deprived him of normal economic and psychological support. It is likely that this early loss of the father, and the urge to redeem the father image may have directed Paul's energies first into medicine, and then into psychiatry. Schilder himself hints as much.

Speaking of himself in the third person, Schilder wrote:[6] "His early memories point to some sort of rebellion against his father, and he has never bowed to authority willingly. The choice of medicine as a profession was . . . partially due to the wish of his mother. She had always given him a feeling of security and self-confidence which never left him, even in the most difficult circumstances." And he adds further: "He still believes in the world and has a basically optimistic outlook."[6]

I have been able to discover but little about Schilder's youth, adolescence and early manhood.

Schilder tells us that he became interested in philosophical problems at the age of 13. Given his superior mentality it is reasonable to suspect that this precocious interest was in part the search for intellectual and

emotional insight, and in part an effort to find security in a clear orientation toward "man and life." Buechner's "Kraft und Stoff" provided him with a materialist foundation. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kant, listed in this odd order were his succeeding interests. Philology and philosophy tempted him further, but he chose medicine because, as he wrote, "he wanted to be in closer relation to human beings." Later he elected the specialty of psychiatry for similar reasons, because therein he saw an approach to "the fundamentals of human life."

In electing medicine Schilder did not turn his back on philosophy, nor on philology either. On the contrary he remained a philosopher to the end. As his knowledge of the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the nervous system increased, and as his experieuce with the mentally ill broadened, his awareness of the need for a philosophic matrix to bind together, to give pattern and meaning to the data of experience increased accordingly. It is thus easy to understand why his work with Gabriel Anton at Halle an der Saale, and his absorption of the teachings of both Meynert and Wernicke nurtured his intellect but left him unsatisfied, and why he felt that the basic insights proffered by both these great neuro-psychiatrists required deeper psychological study. Schilder made an heroic effort to dig deeper, to achieve the penetration he deemed essential. But in his first endeavor he fell short of his aim. Indeed he did not succeed until his knowledge and his thinking were transilluminated and redirected by Freud's teachings.

Schilder's first paper appeared in 1909. Between 1909 and 1914 he published a total of eighteen contributions. Only one among these dealt with a psychiatric subject in the strict sense of the term. All the others were neurological in content; and among them was the paper which fixed Schilder's name in the annals of neurological history: *Zur Frage der Enzephalitis periaxialis diffusa.*

That single psychiatric paper *Ueber das Selbstbewusstsein und seine Störungen* appeared in 1913. It was nine pages long and dealt with a theme to the elaboration of which Schilder devoted the major energies of his remaining years. In 1914 Schilder's first book appeared. It was 304 pages long and was titled *Selbstbewusstsein und Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein.* In the same year Schilder published what may be considered to have been his first psychoanalytically oriented paper. It was titled *Zur Kenntniss symbolähnlicher Bildungen im Rahmen der Schizophrenie.* Schilder stated that by these studies he "was led to a closer approach to

Freudian ideas." His "study on schizophrenia served to further increase his belief in the validity of Freudian symbolism."[6]

However, Schilder's volume *Selbstbewusstsein und Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein*, published in 1914, reveals no analytical insight whatsoever. It was evidently composed before he acquired an effective understanding of psychoanalysis. This volume is a most impressive witness of the impenetrable fog in which psychiatry was engulfed in the pre-Freudian days. Knowledge was vast, but understanding lacking. It was as in the days before the Rosetta Stone was brought to light when all the accumulated hieroglyphics served only to deepen one's sense of frustration and impotence.

Selbstbewusstsein und Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein is a substantial volume wherein, beside reviewing what had been previously taught and written on the problem of depersonalization, Schilder presents numerous carefully and thoroughly detailed case histories. The pages literally scream with a profusion of data which to the psychoanalytically attuned intelligence proffers etiology, and dynamic causality, as well as clear insight into the patient's complaint and behavior. As one turns the pages of this meaty work one is under a sense of intense expectation, one expects page after page to come upon that clinching section, that revealing paragraph which shows that the author has grasped the meaning of the data he has so painstakingly, so fully and so competently gathered and recorded. These expectations, however, go unfulfilled. Only years later, after 1918 after the first World War, after Schilder had come into personal contact with Freud, and into fraternal contact with the Viennese Psychoanalytic Society do we find in the works of Schilder that penetrating and effulgent quality which makes it so outstanding in the literature of psychiatry.

Schilder's contact with Freud and more particularly his contact with psychoanalytic societies is a major chapter in my thesis, and will be developed later. Here we need to take note of a few items in the chronology of Schilder's experience and growth. At the outbreak of the first World War, Schilder volunteered for service in the Austrian Army, and for the duration of the war served first at the front, and then at base hospitals. It is noteworthy and so very characteristic of Schilder's demonic drive, demonic in the Socratic sense, i.e., to learn, to study, to experience, that during these war years and "sometimes under heavy gun fire" he resumed and continued his intensive studies in philosophy and

carried them thru with such competence as to entitle him to a degree of the doctorate in philosophy. It was not, however, to wile the hours away, nor yet to cater to the ambitious demands of an "academic ego" that Schilder was moved to resume his philosophical studies. It was rather because he felt keenly the need for deeper insight into the data of psychologic and psychiatric experience, and because he was persuaded that such an insight could be gained only by reducing the data of experience to some encompassing generalizations. Philosophy alone offered the means for the distillation of quintessential meanings. This, to his own satisfaction he was able to accomplish, and I can do no better than to quote his own words. Two fundamental trends of thought were clarified for him during this period of intensive study: "first, that the laws of the psyche and the laws of the organism are identical, i.e., that thought and imagination can be studied with methods similar to those used in the study of perception; [*and*] second, that this biological process is a process of development which is clearly reflected in the development of each single thought, i.e., that thoughts develop from primitive stages through continuous contact with the motives of experience, passing from a protozoan-like stage to more and more complicated organic forms. In the process of this development the different parts of reality come into focus. Individuals strive towards the world, and through a constructive process arrive at configurations in perception and action. This leads not only to increased insight into the structure of the world, but also to a more satisfactory experience in the unified personality."[6]

This most compact summation of Schilder's psycho-philosophical convictions is not easy to comprehend. Yet it does afford us a key to Schilder's works many of which on superficial inspection might otherwise appear like a motley mass of disjointed excursions.

In the above cited summation there are two departments of thought. Each stands compactly separate, yet both are organically united to yield a superior dynamic resultant. It is worth the cost of some effort to grasp both what is contained and implied in Schilder's summation. This will not only help us to better understand Schilder's work, but will also lay bare the basis of his disagreement with certain psychoanalytic hypotheses and principles.

Schilder first affirms that "the laws of the psyche and the laws of the organism are identical," and that both psyche and organism may be studied by similar if not identical methods. This affirmation, except that

it excludes epiphenomenalism and the vitalistic separation of the psyche, is hardly a distinguished affirmation. Standing alone it would rather arouse our suspicion that we have here the profession of an easy naturalism, one that seeks to reduce psychology to the elementary biology of nerve function. But of course it does not stand alone. It is linked to a second affirmation, namely, "that this biological process is a process of development." This too appears like a relatively innocuous affirmation. However, on inspection we discern that the "dead weight" lies in the term "development." It is far too commonplace a term. *Emergent evolvement* would have better served his intention. For Schilder elaborated this passage as follows: "thoughts develop from primitive stages through continuous contact with the motives of experience, passing from a protozoan-like stage to more and more complicated organic forms."[6] But as we know, the passage "from the protozoan to the complicated organic," involves not a simple and smooth progression but rather a series of cataclysmic transmutations. Then Schilder welds the antecedent affirmations in this final pronouncement: "In the process of this development the different parts of reality come into focus. Individuals strive towards the world, and through a constructive process arrive at configurations [i.e., effective adaptation or symbiotic function] in perception and action. This leads not only to increased insight into the structure of the world, but also to a more satisfactory experience in the unified personality."

What I have quoted of Schilder's own words is taken from the text he published in 1940, the year of his death, yet his words reflect convictions crystallized in his philosophical studies of some twenty years or more before. In 1928 Schilder published a rather elaborate and remarkably comprehensive exposition of his philosophical convictions under the title *Gedanken zur Naturphilosophie*. A reading of these *Gedanken* affords one clear understanding why Schilder was so receptive and responsive to Freud's teachings—and also why he took exception to a number of the psychoanalytic tenets. "No unbiased observer" wrote Schilder, "could afford to neglect the data which Freud had brought forward concerning human drives and the structure of the psychic apparatus." "The fundamentals of dream interpretation and of the libido theory seemed to be beyond doubt, and indeed have proved to be of lasting value for the understanding of the organism." However Schilder criticized and rejected what he termed the "regressive character" of

psychoanalysis, finding it senseless to believe that "life should intend merely to return to prior stages of satisfaction, and to rest," nor would he subscribe to Freud's ideas concerning the death instinct. Schilder wrote his psychiatric credo in the following terms: "Life is not directed towards the past, but rather towards the future . . . psychological processes are directed towards the real world in a process of continuous trial and error. This constructive process leads to comparatively stabilized configurations which represent not only the possibilities for knowledge but also for action."[6]

In 1919 Schilder became a member of the staff and faculty of the University Hospital of Vienna, and there he continued his services and studies until 1929, when he came to stay in the United States. These were fruitful and productive years. The Clinic of Wagner von Jauregg afforded Schilder a fortunate medium for the exercise of his skills and faculties. The Clinic was essentially neurologic and somatic in orientation, yet it tolerated even if it did not aggressively promote, psychoanalytic research and therapy. Poetzl, von Jauregg's assistant, tried to combine psychoanalysis and brain pathology; Schilder actually achieved it. How well he did this is reflected in his splendid monograph *Brain and Personality*.[7] This most pregnant, provocative, and stimulating work, representing the lectures delivered by Schilder at the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic of Johns Hopkins University from 1928 to 1930, still remains a shining example of what I term Integrative Psychiatry. It was gratifying and in many respects reassuring to find Stanley Cobb treating the problem of brain and personality, under the more restricted title "Emotions and Clinical Medicine" in the 1949 Salmon Memorial Lectures. His presentation of the subject matter was quite in the spirit so brilliantly exhibited by Schilder in *Brain and Personality*.

I must confess that I am partial to this one among Schilder's numerous works. I am warmly responsive to the brilliant circular exposition of "brain and personality" which is free of all "parallelisms," and of the naive concepts so common in the current psychosomatic doxy. I particularly appreciate the clear-eyed exposition of what we know and what we do *not* know, and the numerous suggestions for further study and research which dot the pages of this work. Let me cite a few random passages to illustrate the profundity and wide range of this work:[7]

> "We do not believe that a center in the brain ever functions in an isolated way. In the end, brain activity is always an activity of

the whole system. There are only special points which are in special activity."

"I must say that we have studied up to the present time too little of what goes on under the influence of drugs."

"It would be absolutely necessary to study the dreams which occur under the influence of opium and cocaine in order to get a better insight into the problems of addiction." (p. 8)

"It is strange that we know so little about the state of mind of a dizzy person." (p. 12)

"A person who is nauseated is in a special state of mind." (p. 19)

"The close connection between anxiety and sex is from the neurological point of view due to the common localization in the diencephalon. We find in this case, in a rather striking way, what is well known in neurosis, especially of children, that anxiety appears when there is no possibility of transference." (p. 28)

There are interspersed among such direct expositions casual comments which lift the edge of the curtain this side of the infinite.

"It is interesting that if one closes one's fist one begins to sweat and this sweating, melting the objects, has very likely something to do with these tendencies of taking an object into the body." (p. 29)

A comment of this order strikes us as uncanny. It appears to issue from a brain that can draw meaning from the Cabala. Here is another comment of the same order: "action by imitation has a magic background but coordinates also the individual to the actions of other individuals. Certainly this magic-action by imitation belongs to the Id." (p. 30)

The temptation to cite many more passages from this luminous work is hard to resist. Here Schilder appears to have been unbridled in inspiration and imagination. Addressing his peers and confreres he ran, like the virtuoso he was, the full gamut of neurological and psychiatric data, combining them in harmonious, suggestive and inspiring orders. Little the wonder that Adolph Meyer described Schilder "as a representative of European psychiatry combining the training in neurology and internal medicine and psychopathology generally and also psychoanalysis and keenness for the sciences and the philosophical and cultural background." This sentence is lacking in Homeric resonance, but it is sober in its evaluation of the genius of Schilder.

During the ten years of his stay in Vienna, Schilder came into closer

contact with Freud and with the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. During this period he adsorbed and incorporated into his own thinking much of psychoanalytic theory, but during this period likewise there came to the fore those differences which led Schilder to ultimately separate himself from the *so-called* orthodox followers of Freud.

Wittels reports that Freud once criticized Schilder for working in "too wide dimensions," instead of limiting himself to psychoanalytic microscopy. The criticism may or may not have been warranted, but it very aptly reflects the difference in their respective positions. And to understand what some have called Schilder's *defection from*, one needs to fully appreciate Schilder's *profection to*, the psychoanalytic movement.

Schilder did not come to analysis, as did most of Freud's associates and pupils, a novitiate in psychiatry. He was not first indoctrinated in the theory of analysis to later find its validation in experience. On the contrary Schilder brought with him a vast store of neurological, psychiatric and clinical experience which validated analytical theory. But then, and here is where the fracture came, his experience, his knowledge, his understanding, in some directions, outreached the encompassment of analytic theory, and there he could not but follow his own light. In this, one recognizes the kinship between Schilder and Ferenczi. Ferenczi like Schilder though not in the same measure brought with him, when he joined the analytic movement, a sound training in neurology and in "classical" psychiatry. Ferenczi too was at odds with orthodox analytical theory and practice on some of the selfsame scores that agitated Schilder.

I have referred to Schilder's so-called defection from the psychoanalytic movement. One needs to understand just what this defection involved. Schilder never denounced nor renounced psychoanalysis. He merely dissociated himself from those who pretended to be the guardians of analytical orthodoxy, from the so-to-say *Synod of Analysis*. On this score Schilder wrote, still in the third person: "Obviously Schilder's interests did not coincide with those of the psychoanalytic group. He remained un-analyzed. Although his relations to Freud were never particularly close there was no lasting conflict between the two. Later on, in America, he left the psychonalytic society, in part because of his different direction of interests, in part because of some minor local conflicts." Then Schilder offers this profession of belief: "Schilder considers himself a psychoanalyst in the true sense of the word, feeling that he

has kept the heritage of Freud better than many of those who were closer to him personally and who followed at least his words more or less mechanically."[6]

In this profession there lies a crucial issue. For either one needs must side with Schilder and by that token endorse likewise the manner in which he has kept and advanced the heritage of Freud: or one must reject his claims and side with those others who consider themselves the Orthodox.

Two years before he died, Schilder published a book with the unpretentious title *Psychotherapy*.[8] This work may be taken to reflect and to embody his mature convictions and the essentials of his vast experience. Indeed it is a most excellent work, deserving even today much more notice and use than it receives. From the preface I string together a few sentences, taken out of their sequence but not out of their context. "Psychotherapy . . .", Schilder wrote, "is a young science. It is obliged to be bold in its experimental approach. . . . Modern psychotherapy has to utilize psychoanalysis. . . . The new psychotherapy begins with Freud. . . . I have approached psychoanalysis with the spirit of complete inner freedom. I believe that the progress of psychotherapy and of psychoanalysis will be in this direction."[8] (pp. viii-ix)

These words will serve as the text of the issue:

Psychotherapy is young; it should be bold in its experimental approach. We need to approach psychoanalysis with complete inner freedom, for this wise and this wise only will the progress of psychotherapy and of psychoanalysis be assured.

At this point I must leave off recounting the chronology of Schilder's life and turn more specifically to inquire what his life's work may mean to us today, what bearing it may have upon the issues of today: upon contemporary psychiatry. To some, I fear, this inquiry may seem like an academic indulgence. Psychiatry today is in the ascendency. We have 5,000, and we need 18,000 psychiatrists. Psychoanalysis has been thoroughly well publicized. Everyone now appears to be too busy, and too happy in his daily work to bother much about academic inquiries. Furthermore, with the incursion of our European confrères there has been an appreciable stiffening of the orthodox spine, and the virtue of orthodoxy is that you need only to know the answers—you do not need to trouble about the questions.

This I know is a somewhat overdrawn picture. Yet I hold that if

it is not a sober portrait, it is at least a caricature that emphasizes without distorting. To my mind it is very pertinent to inquire what bearing Schilder's work may have upon contemporary psychiatry. For despite its seeming tranquility, the psychiatric scene is not peaceful. There are perceptible to those who would see, disturbing and menacing agitations which, if allowed to grow, unheeded and unchallenged, may deprive us of our gains and impede our further progress. Let me particularize. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy is faced by several challenging movements. Principal among these is a resurgent Pavlovianism. It doesn't always go by that name, indeed it has a variety of names. It is resident in the rationalizations of psychosurgery, of shock treatment, of condition-therapy. It is inherent in the studies of the so-called experimental neuroses. It is the rationale behind so much of the drug therapy to which not a few look to the resolution of the problems of the psychoneuroses and the psychoses.

There are other movements which constitute a challenge to psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Religious sects of varying devotional creeds seek in subtle, tangential, or in aggressive frontal ways to undermine the authority and prestige of psychoanalysis. Voluminous but not as menacing is the nibbling incursion into psychotherapy of the so-called lay therapists. There are others beside, such as the neo-hypnotists, and such organizations as the A.A. But none of these is as menacing as the protean resurgent Pavlovianism. And that for obvious reasons. For all the world is now divided on the issue of Hegelian, Marxist, materialist, mechanistic absolutism—and what for want of an agreed-upon term and in the spirit of the most advanced in modern science I would call —*Relativism.* In different spheres of human experience and human endeavor this contest is waged under different banners—but always one side stands for materialist, mechanist absolutism, and the other for relativism. I need only draw your attention to one of the latest and most stark instances in this conflict of many fronts, that of Michurinian-Lysenkian genetics versus the genetics of the sciences in the democracies.

I am all-too-painfully aware of the magnitude of the thesis here touched upon, and the utter impossibility under the circumstances to expound it even in the merest of its skeletal patterns. Yet I am reconciled to do with it what I can because this thesis bears upon the deepest significance of Schilder's work and also upon our own concerns with the future of psychiatry.

How greatly his contemporaries, and particularly those among them who were trained in the sciences, where shocked by Freud's teachings is common-place knowledge. Their violent reactions, their abusive and calumniating "defenses" remain distinguished by their intensity. All scientific innovations meet opposition and their proponents are abused, but it is questionable whether even Galileo and Darwin were in their persons subjected to as much vituperative abuse as was the person of Freud. I underscore *the person* of Freud, for those who rejected Freud's teachings were not content to pour their scorn upon his teachings alone, but rather deliberately engulfed their author as well.

Palpably Freud deeply disturbed his contemporaries. His teachings evoked in them profound anxieties, for he disoriented them in their familiar spheres. He made their heavens to revolve in unaccustomed patterns and the earth to quake beneath them. And that which disturbed them most was not, as so many believe, his sex theories, but rather his demonstration of "the rationality of the irrational, and the irrationality of the rational." Freud and his followers have had the profoundest and most disturbing effect upon the heretofore unchallenged faith in the rationality of modern man and of modern science. Freud who disclaimed interest and competence in philosophy, and who rather professed himself to be a faithful disciple of modern science, in his teachings cracked and disrupted the foundation assumptions of modern science. But I must hasten to add, taking the words of another Innovator, his intention was not to destroy but to fulfill.

This matter requires some amplification. The rationality of the irrational which Freud demonstrated is not confined to the operations of the Unconscious, profound as that demonstration is. Beyond that lies an even more significant demonstration, equally irrational and inconceivable to the contemporary world of science, namely that effects can arise not solely from entities proper, but also from the relationships existing between entities. The neurosis does not arise from the Id nor from the Super-ego, nor yet from the simple relationship of the one to the other, but rather from a *particular*, that is a qualitatively distinguishable, relationship between them. And the cure of the neurosis lies in benignly altering that relationship. To a world habituated to think in terms of absolute quantities of matter and energy, of causalities in which there is always a demonstrable interplay of matter and energy, the assertion that effects may arise from simple relationships, that qualities may be engen-

dered by mere position, was true anathema, to be cursed and rejected, and its proponents to be pilloried.

How greatly this profound insight distinguishes and enhances the value of Freud's teaching above those of his nearest approximates in psychiatry may be seen in comparing him to Janet. Janet had a superb clinical grasp of the psychopathies, but he never fathomed their basic dynamics, for he persisted in thinking in the current terms of neural structure and neural physiology, and such thinking added up to but one thing, sterile and unilluminating, psychasthenia. Dalbiez who is as fully versed in the teachings of Janet as in those of Freud, writes thus: "Janet holds that obsession is secondary to psychasthenia; Freud that psychasthenia is secondary to obsession. According to Janet . . . the psychasthenic may be compared to a locomotive that lacks fuel. According to Freud, . . . the psychasthenic may be compared to two locomotives, both well provided with fuel and steaming at full pressure, travelling in opposite directions on the same track, and so hindering progress in either direction"[9] (v. 1 pp. 280-281). Janet[10] in his monumental work *Les Obsessions et la Psychasthénie* describes the symptoms of the psychasthenic and obsessive patient with admirable precision, "but they are not given a psychological explanation" (p. 281). Dalbiez equates Janet's position to that of the English School of radical empiricism. "It implies static atomism, acknowledging *things* only, and ignoring their relations." Then Dalbiez adds this significant comment: "Though Freud is by no means a metaphysician, his technique of investigation led him to distinguish between unconsciousness of *events* . . . and unconsciousness of *relations between events*. . . . "

It is in this connection that Pavlov's work comes to the fore both as a validation of and as a great menace to Freud's psychic dynamism. Pavlov in his extensive studies on the conditioned reflex demonstrated among many other things that the establishment of *unconscious relations between events* is an inherent competence of the neural organism. It is possible to engraft upon a rational, i.e., utilitarian and effective pattern of function, such as salivation in the sight of food, completely unrelated, arbitrary, and in human terms irrationally associated stimuli, and having done so one finds the function pattern persisting even after the absolute stimulus, in this case food, has been withdrawn. Pavlov has furthermore shown that it is possible to engraft upon a conditioned reflex further conditionings, that it is possible in other words to condition a

conditioned reflex. The super-imposed conditioning may be reinforcing, or inhibitory. It is the latter which concerns us in particular for it was in this wise that Pavlov induced experimental neuroses in his animals.

The classical instance of an experimental neurosis, as you will recall, involves a dog exposed to a luminous circle and so conditioned that at its sight he salivates. When such an animal is then exposed to an ellipse whose larger axis is equal to the diameter of the circle and the shorter to half that, the animal will at first salivate. But if the dog is given food when the circle is exhibited and *not* when the ellipse is shown, the animal soon learns to distinguish between the circle and the ellipse. The discriminative reaction, involving as is to be appreciated an inhibitory action, will persist even when the ratio of the two axes of the ellipse increases from 1:2 to 7:8. However, when the axis ratio reaches 8:9 the balance between the stimulus for the circle and the inhibition for the ellipse is destroyed. Then the dog becomes nervous, whines on the stand, twists and turns, snaps at the apparatus, and when retested is found no longer able to differentiate between the circle and an ellipse with the axis ratio of 1:2.[9] (p. 63). Commenting on this and similar studies Pavlov observes: "We can regard these disturbances as due to a conflict between the process of excitation and inhibition which the cortex finds difficult to resolve."[9] (p. 63). Pavlov's experiments thus offer "irrefutable proof of the existence of neurotic disorders due to a clash of opposed forces," and give Freud's claim a confirmation which in several important points amounts to a final demonstrative proof.[9] (v. 2, p. 68). All this would seem like a most welcome support from far quarters, but we must recall the ancient warning "*timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*"

Pavlov disavowed all pre-occupation with psychology, holding himself to be a physiologist, yet he explicitly asserts that conflict neuroses in men and in animals are fundamentally identical.[11] And those who are persuaded by his claims often go further and inverse the demonstration to hold that Freud validates Pavlov. They draw from this the corollary that reflexology, now does, or in time, will account for most if not all of the Freudian dynamisms.

To the uncritical it is easy to assume that when "the cortex finds it difficult to resolve the conflict between the process of excitation and of inhibition," the fault must lie in the cortex. It is then logical to seek *that* fault in the cortex with all the armamentaria of the histological,

physiological, and biochemical laboratories, and in the interim to "amend" the fault by shock therapy, psychosurgery, drugs, etc.

That I may not be misunderstood I must affirm that it is not to shock therapy, psychosurgery, and drug therapy *per se* that I object, but to the frame work of rationale within which, and by which, they are conceived and justified.

By these presentations you will gather that it is my conviction that we have of late lost ground to those who are mechanistic, materialistic, and absolutists in their thinking. Freud's appreciation of the effects derived from relations is now overshadowed by the achievements of those preoccupied with things in themselves. To those who are alerted to this condition the presenting evidences are many. Yet I would here cite two corroborative instances which came to my attention recently. In the volume entitled *Adaptation*, edited by John Romano, and representing the papers presented at the opening of a new psychiatric wing at the Strong Memorial Hospital in Rochester, there are two essays, one by Homer W. Smith, and the other by Lawrence S. Kubie. Both of these are germane to our theme. Homer Smith is a preeminent physiologist, and a distinguished research worker, yet he avows his allegiance to that naive mechanismic hypothesis pronounced by John Tyndall in 1868, an hypothesis "that for every fact of consciousness, whether in the domain of sense, of thought, or of emotion, a certain definite molecular condition is set up in the brain; that this relation of physics to consciousness is invariable, so that, given the state of the brain, the corresponding thought or feeling might be inferred; or given the thought or feeling, the corresponding state of the brain might be inferred." (p. 48). Smith further asserts that he is firm in the conviction that the whole is no greater than the sum of its parts, that in other words, he is a pristine Cartesian. Smith recognizes no effects arising from the *relationship* of entities. Kubie speaking on the same occasion exhibits a fear, not of the unknowable but of the unconscious. In a sweeping generalization he affirms that "whenever most of the determining psychological forces are conscious, the resulting conduct will merit being called normal, because it will be free to learn and capable of adapting flexibility to changing external realities. On the other hand, where unconscious forces dominate, or where conscious and unconscious forces pursue incompatible goals, then the behavior which results will deserve to be called 'neurotic'" (p. 91). Kubie is persuaded that "we should attempt in every way that it is

possible to extend the area of conscious motivation and purpose and control in human life, and to shrink and circumscribe the territories of that dark empire which is ruled by unconscious forces." (p. 96).

It is most profoundly satisfying to turn from these to Schilder's rich and profound exposition of the multiform nuances of being. Schilder is not frightened by the "territories of the dark empire," for he knows that in them are rooted the instinctual drives, "*das spezifische Lebendigsein liegt im triebhaften Streben, das die Erfüllung des Triebes überdauert.*"[12] (p. 99).

In this poetically phrased, but involved and almost untranslatable dictum, Schilder affirms that the "intent" of the instinctual drive does not terminate with its gratification on fulfillment but reaches forth, rather, toward objectives which transcend and outlast it. "The instincts" Schilder wrote, "impel toward the world, toward other humans, and the preservation of one's own life and that of the species is the resultant but not the aim [of the instinctual drives]. Both life and death are the issue of the strivings of the living, and the conceivable, experiencable, content of the instinctual drives extends beyond the preservation of life, even as the sense and worth of life, is not confined to its mere preservation."[12] (p. 102).

Whereas in the aforementioned work *Adaptation* Homer Smith postulates "that primordially what protoplasm wants is to be left alone" (p. 42), Schilder in contrast holds that life without purpose, living matter without objective, is inconceivable. "*Stets setzt sich das Individuum Zwecke, handelt nach ihnen, es ist triebhaft in die Zukunft gewendet.*"[12] (p. 38). "The organism," Smith holds, "like the cell, does not act; it only reacts" (p. 37). Schilder in contrast affirms that "the organism has an objective, and represents a purposeful whole." ("*der Organismus sich Zwecke setzt und ein zweckvolles Ganze darstellt.*"[12] (p. 50)).*

I am sure you will not misconstrue the aforegoing citations as a polemical venture to embroil the authors cited. I refer to them only to illustrate how sharply the relativistic philosophy upon which psychoanalysis was founded, and rests, is today challenged.

I am persuaded, that the philosophical epistemological foundation of psychoanalysis is too much overlooked, and too much neglected today,

* "*Man muss sich endgültig klarmachen, dass das Physikalische unter der Kategorie der Kausalität, der Organismus als solcher aber wie das Psychische unter der Kategorie des Zweckes steht.*" [12] (p. 49).

and that therein lies great danger. Our younger, "third generation," analytic psychiatrists seem little inclined to wrestle with fundamentals. Perhaps they need to be reminded of Goethe's words:

Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
Erwirb es um es zu besitzen
(What you inherited from your forefathers
you must earn in order to possess)

It would ill become me to sermonize my contemporaries, nor is it my intention to do so. But insofar as we have gathered to celebrate the memory of a man whom we hold dear, it is fitting and indeed our obligation, to reanimate his spirit, to speak his speech, to think his thoughts, to advance his goals. And if in all these there lies some challenge, then we needs must accept the challenge in grace and gratitude.

We need to approach psychoanalysis with complete inner freedom, Schilder said, for this wise and this wise only will the progress of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis be assured. In this spirit then I would inquire how much "inner freedom is there in our approach to analysis"? In a few, all-too-few centers in our country, this "inner freedom" is manifest. For the rest there is but an uncritical "remouthing of worn phrases," a slavish adherence to form and formulae. "Psychotherapy is young; it should be bold in its experimental approach!" How bold *have* we been? Have we ventured to retest our assumptions; have we reassessed our formulations? What *do we know* of the dynamics by which the cure is effected? What is the derivation and structure of the Ego? Whence is the Super-ego derived? How free is free association? What is the scope and embrace of the Oedipal situation? Is incest the full burden of its thesis? Is there not also a lesson to be drawn from the fate of Laius, who in seeking to circumvent his destiny, brought ruin upon his entire house? What of dreams; have Freud and Stekel exhausted these labyrinthine catacombs of the unconscious? And above all have we done and are doing all we can to advance our therapeutic efficacy? How much of our passivity derives not from the actual requirements of the therapeutic situation, but from our fear and unwillingness to assume responsibility, or because we have not worked on our case enough to know what to do?

I am certain that each of you can greatly extend this catalogue of inquiries; but I must leave off at this point to turn to another consideration. In reassessing our assumptions, and in retesting our theories and

practices, we would not only be manifestly freed in our approach to analysis but would establish the basis for that bold experimental venturesomeness which alone can assure the continued vitality of psychoanalysis and of psychotherapy. This is the prerequisite for that order of integrative psychiatry which Schilder's own work so beautifully typifies, and to the advancement of which Schilder devoted his inexhaustible energies.

Having swept so wide a terrain perhaps it were best that I ended with a more parochial version of my argument. It is that in the last twenty years much has been achieved in neuro-physiology, and in the "mechanistic" therapies of the psychopathies. These achievements unillumined by psychonanalytic or as I have termed it, by *relativistic* insight, are advanced as a challenge not only to psychoanalysis, but also to the psychoanalytic mode of reading and interpreting the data of experience. During this same period the analytical corps with but few and singular exceptions has failed to take adequate cognizance of the achievements in neuro-physiology and in the mechanistic therapies, has not subjected its own theories and practices to a bold and objective reassessment, and has not endeavored to integrate its own knowledge with those knowledges emanating from other sources and disciplines. I repeat, there are a few and singular exceptions, and in them I might add lies our hope. Despite these exceptions, however, the challenge which is levelled against the representative and authoritative organizations holds.

Ending on this note I am *not* sure that I have fulfilled one of Harvey's requirements for the good memorial lecture, namely, to exhort the listeners "to continue in love and affection among themselves." My final "note" sounds too belligerent for that. But I don't intend to be belligerent. I intend it to be suppliant and persuasive. That's quite in Schilder's spirit, which was tolerant, without being indifferent. That too is a prerequisite for the cultivation of integrative psychiatry.

Yet I draw assurance that I will not be misunderstood here—among the associates of the Schilder Society.

Emerson said that an Institution is but the lengthened shadow of a good man. Certain, our Society is that: the living animating shadow of an ingenious scholar, and original spirit, and a good man. May the inspiring memory of the founder of our Society be long indwelling in our midst.

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